Islamic State: An Iranian Story

Executive Summary

- On January 3, 2024, Islamic State - Khorasan Province orchestrated a devastating coordinated attack in Kerman, Iran, marking the deadliest terrorist incident in the country since 1979, with 94 fatalities and 280 injuries.
- Despite receiving specific intelligence warnings from the U.S. about the impending threat from Islamic State, the attackers successfully executed the bombing, demonstrating sophisticated operational capabilities and intent to target symbolic and strategic locations within Iran.
- The attack underscores Islamic State’s enduring animosity toward Iran, rooted in deep-seated ideological and sectarian divisions, and signals a persistent, albeit sporadic, threat to Iranian security.

Background

On January 03, 2024 Islamic State - Khorasan Province (ISKP) carried out a coordinated Personnel-Bourne Improvised Explosive Device Attack (PBIED) in Kerman, southern Iran. The attack killed 94 people and wounded a further 280, making it the worse terrorist attack on Iranian soil since the 1979 revolution.

The attackers targeted the fourth anniversary commemoration procession marking the death of Iranian General, Qasim Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Forces who was killed by US forces in 2020. IS later explained they had chosen the target as an act of vengeance for all the Muslims killed in Iraq and Syria by Soleimani and claimed the attack constituted a major blow to the Iranian government.

Reports indicate that the US had warned Iran of the impending attack after acquiring intelligence that Islamic State’s affiliate in Afghanistan, ISKP, was plotting the attack and allegedly gave Tehran specific information which should have enabled them to have thwarted or mitigated against the attack.

Attack preparation

On January 11, the Iranian authorities stated that they had identified the main suspect behind the attack and named him as Tajik national, Abdullah Tajik. He had crossed into Iran in mid-December over the south-east border and left two days before the attack occurred after constructing the explosive devices.

He was allegedly accompanied by the two bombers, one of which was named as another Tajik national, 24-year-old Baziroof Israeli. The cell stayed in a safe house on the outskirts of Kerman as they prepared for the attack. Reports indicate that while at the safe house, the cell would bury their electronic devices when not in use in an attempt to prevent any electronic monitoring of their location.

Attack execution

Between 1303 and 1314hrs on January 03, the two bombers left the safe house, wearing their explosive vests concealed under clothing, and joined the procession. The procession was making its way north from the city towards the Golzar Shohada Cemetery, the final resting place of Soleimani.

The first device was detonated at 1455hrs at the northern most junction, around 700 metres west of the tomb. The bomber detonated at a chokepoint prior to any security checkpoints. Twenty minutes later, at 1515hrs, the second bomber detonated at the southern junction around 1km from the original attack site. The attack was likely aimed at first responders, but would also have targeted civilians trying to evacuate the area of the initial attack back towards the city.

Islamic State claimed responsibility the following day, attributing the attack to their Iranian branch, however, US intelligence, Iranian investigations, and analysis of the attack all strongly point to ISKP as the culprit.

Graphic: Attack location and execution

Raedan Group intelligence & operations

Assessment

The attack is not the first time Islamic State has conducted attacks in Iran. In June 2017, they killed 17 people when they attacked Iran’s parliament and the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini shrine, symbols of the republic and the revolution. Those attacks came as the wider Islamic State group in neighbouring Iraq and Syria was coming under increasing pressure from the Iraqi government and its allies, including the US, and were seen as a attempted to demonstrate the group’s resilience and reach while playing to its narrative as a defender of Sunni Muslims.

It is this last factor which remains a key motivator for Islamic State, a Sunni Salafi-Jihadist outfit, which sees Iran, a Shia theocracy, as an ideological rival and backer of Shia armed groups which have battled Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.

ISKP is expected to retain intent to target Iran as part of its wider efforts to establish a caliphate across the old Persian Khorasan Province, an area which encompassed parts of Iran, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The group has a long term objective of increasing its foreign operations after establishing safe havens in northern and eastern Afghanistan as it seeks to expand regionally.